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State consolidation is widely considered to be the most important issue for the
development of Africa (e.g., Levy and Sahr Kpundeh 2004), and State failure is of-
ten related to diculties presented by articial international boundaries (Alesina,
Easterly, and Matuszevski 2012). Some authors even consider redrawing interna-
tional boundaries to be a serious option (e.g., Englebert 2000, 181-189, Herbst
2000, 262-269). For the most part, these boundaries were xed by European colo-
nial powers and arbitrarily delineated (Barbour 1961 and other references cited in
Englebert, Tarango, and Carter 2002), and they have rarely been modied since
then (Brownlie 1979). Given the weakness of African States, the reach of national
policies in peripheral border areas has been extensively questioned. Furthermore,
African borders are often assumed to be permeable, particularly to informal trade
and migration ows that may level international dierences. Are African bound-
aries still abstract lines drawn on a map, so that divided areas remain alike and no
dierence in welfare is observed when crossing the border? Or have they become
real,strong discontinuities that reveal an ongoing process of national integration?
These are the questions that we address in this paper.
The literature on Africa's development presents a variety of arguments regard-
ing the role played by boundaries between States.
A rst group of contributions supports the idea of boundaries' weaknesses and
porosity. This idea is implicitly present in papers stressing the role of geography
(e.g., Bloom and Sachs 1998). Other papers more directly build upon the under-
development of state institutions. According to Herbst (2000, 171), the guaranty
from the United Nations discourages African States from investing in territorial
control; whoever holds the capital city holds the country, \the broadcast of power
radiating out [from the political core] with decreasing authority". These \territory-
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states", as opposed to nation-states, are in keeping with pre-colonial political in-
stitutions in a context of low population density. Within former French West
Africa, Huillery (2009) relates part of the present-day spatial inequality within
countries to decentralized policies in early colonial times. Other papers propose
the role of ethnicity. Common languages and cultures contribute to informal cross-
border ows of goods, money, and people across \permeable boundaries" (Griths
1996). Studying the markets for millet and cowpea at the Niger-Nigeria border,
Aker et al. (2010, 26) argue that \ethnic borders map the geography of trade
more eectively than international borders do". According to Michalopoulos and
Papaionnou (2012, 2013), in Africa, precolonial political institutions are a more
powerful determinant of development than national institutions. At the border
between Co^te d'Ivoire and Ghana, Bubb (2012) nds no dierence in the man-
agement of property rights on land. Finally, Easterly and Levine (1998) nd that
countries' growth is strongly inuenced by the countries' neighbors.
A second strand of the literature stresses the salience of national idiosyncrasies
and a centripetal eect of boundaries. As noted by Robinson (2002) in his review
of Herbst, the boundaries of Latin American countries, which became indepen-
dent at the beginning of the 19th century and are now considered well-established
nation-states, also exhibit some degree of arbitrariness. Bach (2007) presents a
similar argument. Furthermore, ethnic salience is not fate. Posner (2004) observes
that among two ethnic groups at the border between Malawi and Zambia, ethnic
identication varies when crossing the border. Miguel (2004) suggests that the
promotion of national identity by the Tanzanian leader Julius Nyerere succeeded
in canceling out the negative impact of within-village ethnic heterogeneity on pub-
lic goods provision observed in neighboring villages of Kenya. Furthermore, many
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authors emphasize that dierences in prices, taxes, and market demand create eco-
nomic opportunities that are exploited every day by agents living in border areas
(Bach 1997, Nugent 2002). Although initially arbitrarily delineated, boundaries
have become a reality, if only for economic life. Comparing communities on both
sides of the Co^te d'Ivoire-Ghana border, MacLean (2010) argues that patterns of
social insurance dier and were shaped by colonial and post-colonial state action.
Asiwaju (1976) and Miles (1994) develop similar arguments about the contrast
between British and French colonial imprints at the Benin-Nigeria and the Niger-
Nigeria borders, respectively. Finally, at the macroeconomic level, the inequality
of income between African countries is larger than usually thought. According to
Schultz (1998), the log variance of GDP per capita in PPP reached 0.415 in 1989
in Africa (including North Africa), which is by far the highest level of all regions
of the world. Furthermore, this number is twice as high as it was in 1960 (0.213).
Of course, income divergence between African countries may only reect the di-
vergence of their centers rather than their border areas. However, this possibility
would be dicult to reconcile with a strong inuence of neighbors on growth.1
Drawing from a large set of household surveys covering the 1986{98 period,
we estimate regression discontinuity designs at the borders of Co^te d'Ivoire with
Ghana, Mali, and Guinea, focusing on four welfare outcomes: consumption and
children's nutritional status (height-for-age), on the one hand, and the connection
to electricity and access to safe water, on the other hand. When discussing the
main results, we also examine household cash crop output and incomes.
1The insulating power of boundaries is not necessarily for the good. Englebert, Tarango, and
Carter (2002) talk of political \dismemberment" and \suocation". Further, the \balkanization"
of Africa is often believed to prevent the exploitation of returns to scale, despite eorts of regional
trade integration. However, the impact of full political integration is dierent from a simple size
merger (Spolaore and Wacziarg 2005).
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Co^te d'Ivoire is an interesting case study; at least in the 1980s and 1990s, it
was much wealthier than all of its neighbors. The evidence provided by border
discontinuity estimates is more mixed.
We document the hazards that commanded the alignment of boundaries during
the colonial era and show that predetermined geographical and historical condi-
tions should not account for border discontinuities in welfare.
At the eastern border with Ghana and at the end of the 1980s, large border
discontinuities existed for the four outcomes. However, because the 1990s brought
crisis to Co^te d'Ivoire and recovery in Ghana, border dierences in income were
very much attenuated, and the discontinuity in nutrition vanished. Discontinuities
in access to electricity and water were preserved. In contrast, at the northern bor-
der with poorer and landlocked Mali and in the mid-1990s, Co^te d'Ivoire performed
better in terms of income and nutrition, but not in access to utilities. The border
with Guinea provides a case in which the Co^te d'Ivoire advantage is canceled out
along all dimensions. A more detailed analysis shows that income derived from
cash crops almost fully accounts for the large dierences in consumption at the
borders of Ghana and Mali. Because the cocoa frontier had not yet reached the
extreme west in the 1990s, the same factor explains why no discontinuity is found
at the border with Guinea.
Border discontinuities reveal the role of two types of national policies: policies
aecting cash crop production and public investment in utilities. Although dier-
ences in such policies have had large and visible impacts at borders, they are not
irreversible, and some of them were changed in the years that followed. We con-
clude that large border discontinuities can be observed between African countries
in the short run, but they do not necessarily reect divergent trajectories linked
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to long-lasting institutional features.
Section I presents the analytical methodology and explains the econometrics.
Section II documents the historical and geographical backgrounds of borders. Sec-
tion III presents survey data and border discontinuities in development outcomes,
rst for the eastern border with Ghana and then for the northern borders. Sec-
tion IV provides further discussion of the cash crop channel and national policies.
Section V concludes.
I. Analytical methodology
Here, we discuss the conditions under which the borders we study can be considered
historical \natural experiments". Consider a person born somewhere in the area
now named Co^te d'Ivoire. What would her welfare be if Co^te d'Ivoire had been
colonized by the British instead of the French, like Ghana, and then exposed
to post-colonial Ghanian policies and institutions? This question is dicult to
answer for at least three reasons: (i) the British could have established dierent
institutions to rule Co^te d'Ivoire; (ii) Ghana and Co^te d'Ivoire combined would not
be the same, if only because of market size and general equilibrium considerations;
and (iii) even if Ghana's institutions had remained the same, we have no idea
how Co^te d'Ivoire's initial characteristics would interact with them. Now, take a
person born in Co^te d'Ivoire at the border of Ghana and imagine that the border
was some kilometers farther. Including this person in Ghana would have a marginal
and insignicant impact on Ghana's institutions and economy. Furthermore, it is
very probable that this close neighbor of actual Ghanaian people would share the
same geographical constraints and the same precolonial initial conditions.
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Let Y be some outcome variable (income, connection to electricity, etc.) ob-
served over a sample of people living in two countries at the same date. Let
C = 0; 1 be the dummy variable indicating the country of residence. Let Yi(0)
be the outcome if and when the individual (or household) i lives in the country
C = 0 and Yi(1) in the country C = 1. The observed outcome reads thus:
Yi = (1  Ci):Yi(0) + Ci:Yi(1): (1)
The identication of the average treatment eect, E[Y (1)   Y (0)], is probably
out of reach, but a regression discontinuity (RD) design based on distance to the
border should correctly approach its local version (LATE) in the vicinity of the
border.
Required assumptions for a border RD
Let Di stand for the distance to the border of the locality of residence, positively
signed for country 1 and negatively signed for country 0, so that Ci = 1fDi  0g.
Under the assumption that E[Y (0)jD = d] and E[Y (1)jD = d] are continuous
in d, limd!0+ E[Y jD = d]   limd!0  E[Y jD = d] provides an estimation of the
average treatment eect at the border (Hahn, Todd, Van Der Klauw 2001). It is
the so-called \sharp" RD estimator. As Lee (2008) argues in another context, this
continuity assumption is dicult to assess and impossible to test. Lee's reformula-
tion elucidates the conditions under which an RD replicates a random assignment
around the threshold D = 0. Assume Y is generated by a partially unobservable
random variable W : Y (0) = y0(W ) and Y (1) = y1(W ). W represents the \type"
of individuals, households, or localities with respect to Y . Finally, let F (djw)
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stand for the cdf of D conditional on W . Lee's conditions are as follows (Lee 2008,
679):
(i) F (djw) is such that 0 < F (0jw) < 1
(ii) F (djw) is continuously dierentiable in d at d = 0, for each w in the support
of W
Condition (i) of overlap requires that D can be written D = Z(W ) + e, where
Z is the predictable component of D and e is an exogenous random chance compo-
nent, so that the probability of receiving treatment is somewhere between 0 and 1
for each type. Condition (ii) of unconfoundedness implies that conditional density
f(djw) is continuous in d at d = 0. In our case, this implies that within each
type w and very near to the border, the probability of being allocated to one side
or another is the same. However, in the overall population, D can be arbitrarily
correlated with Y (0) or Y (1); Y may also be directly generated by D in addition
to W (Lee 2008, 680). Under these conditions, the RD estimate is a weighted
average of the dierence y1(w)  y0(w) for each type w, with weights equal to the
probability of being close to the border: f(0jw)=f(0).
At the locality level, Lee's conditions require that border localities are not
sorted by \types" w between the two countries. This randomness of distance to
the border should stem from the historical hazards of boundary alignment during
the colonial period, which we document below.
At the individual level, the same conditions require that people do not \manip-
ulate" their distance to the border through migration. This is typically an issue
for embodied outcomes such as human capital. International migration based on
y1(w)  y0(w), or more generally on w, is obviously the worst case. However, even
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internal migration ows based on w are a source of bias because the center of one
country may be more attractive than the other for a given type w (for instance, a
larger number of good schools or good jobs in Abidjan than in Accra).
Because we do not observe types w; we cannot test directly for the validity of
these assumptions, namely that the distribution of the \types" w is the same on
both sides near the border.
However, we can check the continuity of the density f(d) at d = 0 to detect
sorting at the border (i.e., selective village settlement or migration). Additionally,
we can test for discontinuities in the distribution of observable variables that can be
considered predetermined, such as geographical variables. This is done in section
II.
We address internal migration to border areas by restricting our estimates
to the sub-sample of household heads born in border districts (Ghana border) or
belonging to the Mande-Voltaic ethnic group (northern borders). For international
migration, we additionally exclude heads who are not nationals of the side where
they live (e.g., Malians who live on the Co^te d'Ivoire side of the border area). This
is a very conservative procedure because migrations out of border areas to capital
cities or to wealthier areas are disregarded. In previous versions of this work,
we showed that doing so provides a lower bound for the Co^te d'Ivoire advantage
because the impact of internal migrations within this country dominates the impact
of other migration ows.
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Implementation of border RD estimates
To implement the border RD estimator just described, the regression functions
E[Y (1)jD = d; C = 1] and E[Y (0)jD = d; C = 0] must be estimated around the
border point D = 0. Sample sizes preclude using more exible but slowly con-
verging non-parametric estimators. As is often done in the literature, we therefore
introduce parametric assumptions. Furthermore, we conservatively collapse all
data at the level of surveys' primary sample units (PSUs) and analyze the PSUs'
averages. All estimates use the PSUs' sample weights.2 We consider three kinds
of estimators.
First, we implement locally linear regressions for narrow enough bandwidths h
equal to either 50 or 75 km:
Y = (h):C + 0(h) + 0(h):(1  C):D + 1(h):C:D + " (2)
for  h  D  h, and with h = 50; 75. We call this estimator \border RD".
Second and alternatively, we disregard distance to the border D and estimate
a polynomial of degree three in latitude and longitude, like Dell (2010):
Y = (h):C + P (a(h); LAT; LON) +  (3)
for  h  D  h, again h = 50; 75, and a(h) 2 R9. In this case, we assume that
this cubic polynomial in latitude and longitude adequately describes the space of
\types" w on both sides of the border.3 We call this estimator \polynomial RD".
2To correct for dierences in sampling rates between countries, PSUs' sample weights are
re-scaled by countries' total population. Of course, those \population weights" are still treated
as probabilistic weights for statistical inference.
3P (a; LAT;LON) = a10LAT+a01LON+a20LAT
2+a02LON
2+a11LAT:LON+a30LAT
3+
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Third and last, we implement a matching estimator on geographical distance
that includes controls for distance to the border (i.e., combines matching and RD
features). We call this \matching RD". This is inspired by Gibbons, Machin,
and Silva (2009). We match each PSU j with its nearest neighbor (j) on the
other side of the border. We sign the dierences in outcome between matches
(Yj = Yj   Y(j)) so that positive dierences designate a Co^te d'Ivoire (C = 1)
advantage. We then regress the signed dierence on the distance to the border of
the matched PSU, again with locally linear regressions on each side:
Y = (h) + 00(h):(1  C):D + 01(h):C:D +  (4)
for  h  D  h and h = 50; 75. Because dierent localities j in the same country
can share the same nearest neighbor , we cluster the standard error  by .4
In the case of the Mali border, where sample sizes do not allow the implemen-
tation of the narrowest 50 km bandwidth, we instead produce 100 km bandwidth
estimates, where, for \border RD" and \matching RD", we add the square of the
distance to the border (D2, interacted with the C dummy as well).
When examining border discontinuities in development outcomes, we add to
all specications a few geographical controls: we use latitude in the case of the
Ghana and Guinea borders and longitude in the case of Mali as well as rainfalls,
elevation, and distance to the nearest river. In specication (4), we use the dier-
ence between matched neighbors for all of these variables (again signed properly).
a03LON
3 + a21LAT
2:LON + a12LAT:LON
2
4We also attempted a richer model that included the distance to the border of the matches.
The estimates were not signicantly dierent from those of the simpler model, although they
were sometimes more imprecise. For the 75 km bandwidth sample of PSUs, the average distance
to the border of the nearest neighbor matches varies between 10 and 13 km.
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In the remainder of this paper, we use the acronym \BD" for border discontinuity.
II. Historical and geographical background
We rst document the historical alignment of the boundaries around Co^te d'Ivoire,
drawing from the literature as well as from dedicated research in French colonial
archives. This approach allows us to address the overlap assumption (random
chance component of borders, see above).5 Then, we document the geographical
features of the boundaries. A few statistical tests assess the unconfoundedness
assumption.
History
The drawing of boundaries in West Africa was arbitrary, to a large extent (e.g.,
Hargreaves 1985), and very often divided pre-colonial political entities. Even struc-
tured kingdoms drew no maps, and they could be composed of groups that spoke
dierent languages, such as the Gyaman kingdom across the border from Ghana
(Terray 1982). Ethnic groups are historical objects that were at least inuenced, if
not constructed, by pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial politics (e.g., Amselle
and M'Bokolo 1985, Posner 2005). Furthermore, the classication of ethnic names
is not independent from the national political economy. Despite these caveats, we
veried in available mappings (Murdock 1959; language maps from Ethnologue:
Lewis 2009) that the international boundaries we consider are not confounded by
hard delimitations between ethno-linguistic areas.
5For the sake of space, we only present a brief summary of our historical investigation. A
supplemental appendix on history is available at http://wber.oxfordjournals.org/.
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During the 19th century, the largest part of the border between Co^te d'Ivoire
and Ghana was under the domination of the Ashanti Empire, whose capital city,
Kumasi, was located in central present-day Ghana. In localities that lie no further
than 75 km from this border and in the years 1986{8, surveys indicate that more
than 50% of household heads belonged to the Akan ethno-linguistic grouping,
which includes the Ashanti people: 56% on the Co^te d'Ivoire side and 59% on
the Ghana side. At the end of the 19th century, the French and British began to
extend their domination from trade posts located on the coast toward the North by
signing protectorate treaties with local kingdoms. Negotiations between the two
colonial powers nally resulted in partitions of pre-colonial political entities in the
middle part of the border (Gyaman, Indenie, Sefwi). In its southern part (Sanwi), a
rebellion unsuccessfully challenged the border alignment after independence. The
layout of the last demarcation on the eld, with teak trees, beacons, and pillars,
was achieved in 1988.
The two other borders of Co^te d'Ivoire that we examine are less clearly demar-
cated on the eld (Brownlie 1979). In surveys, the great majority of household
heads belong to the Mande-Voltaic ethno-linguistic grouping. In particular, the
boundary between Co^te d'Ivoire and Mali lies across the Senoufo (Gur/Voltaic)
area in its eastern part and the Malinke (Mande) area in its western part. The
hazards of French conquest and of the wars against the Almami Samori Toure at
the end of the 19th century reected the boundaries' alignment within the French
Empire and resulted in partitions of some former political entities (Kenedougou
and Kong kingdoms). These borders were only stabilized after World War I.
We also use French data for the colonial period (Huillery 2009) and explore
dierences in initial conditions between the border areas lying inside the French
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empire (Mali and Guinea). Pairwise comparisons do not reveal signicant dier-
ences in terms of European settlement, tax revenue, or public expenditures (see
table S1.1 in the supplemental appendix). One exception is perhaps that the
Mali border districts exhibited higher population density. As we shall see in the
following subsection, this feature has been reversed since then.
Geography
First, we check the continuity of the density of the distance to the border. The
usual RD tests for sorting (Lee 2008, McCrary 2008) must be adapted to our
context. We cannot only count the number of primary sample units because the
sample stratication and sample rates dier between country surveys. For each
bandwidth and each border size, we compute standardized \relative PSU weights"
by dividing the original weights by their mean. The test then detects whether
relatively more people are found closer to the border on one side compared to the
other. The rst row in Table 1 shows the result of this test in the case of the
Ghana border. No border discontinuity is detected; one minor exception is the
polynomial method at a bandwidth of 50 km. The same is found for Mali and
Guinea at 75 km distance (see appendix table A.1), which will be our preferred
bandwidth everywhere.
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Figure 1: Map of border areas with PSUs and regional cities
Atlantic Ocean
Ghana
Mali
Burkina Faso
Côte d'Ivoire
Guinea
Liberia
Grand-Bassam
Sunyani
Berekum
Bondoukou
Abengourou
Odienné
Wa
ManDanané
Nzérékoré
Note: Black dots indicate the location of primary sample units (PSUs) for the 1986{8 surveys at the Co^te
d'Ivoire-Ghana border and for the 1992{4 surveys at the borders with Mali and Guinea. Grey diamonds indicate
the location of regional cities (5,000 inhabitants or more) as of 1990; city names are reported only for cities over
30,000 inhabitants. The dashed line delineates the 75 km bandwidth around the boundaries.
We then characterize the PSUs of household surveys by ve geographical vari-
ables: rainfall, elevation, distance to the nearest river, population density, distance
to the closest regional city, and distance to the capital city (for more details on
variable sources and construction, see supplemental appendix S2). The geograph-
ical locations of cities with 5,000 inhabitants or more in the years 1960 and 1990
15
are drawn from the Africapolis database.6 Even natural geography should not be
too quickly considered to be predetermined before the drawing of the boundaries.
Deforestation can inuence rainfall, and even elevation or watercourses can, to
some extent, be reshaped by human activity. Further, geographical discontinuities
are measured on a sample of localities whose settlement is not random. However,
we expect to nd no or few discontinuities in rainfalls, altitude, and hydrography,
and we regard this result as corroborating the quasi-randomness of the bound-
aries' alignment. Conversely, constructed geography, such as population density
or city distribution, is far from being independent from boundaries. Nevertheless,
we want to explore the extent to which discontinuities in welfare should be linked
to discontinuities in urban structures. Finally, due to dierences in countries'
shape and spatial organization, distance to the capital or main city does not vary
smoothly at borders. Any border eect includes a change in the capital city and
a shift in the distance to it.
The major part of the border of Co^te d'Ivoire with Ghana does not follow a
natural line, except the lagoon in the extreme South and the Black Volta river
in the extreme North. Given our sample distribution, these two parts contribute
little to our estimates, and withdrawing them changes nothing. The border with
Ghana does not exhibit any discontinuity in our geographical variables, except
distance to the capital city: the Ghana border is closer to Abidjan than it is to
Accra by 130 to 150 km (table 1).
6This database from geographers (SEDET, CNRS and University Paris-7) is probably the
most complete to date. We are grateful to Eric Denis for making it available to us. We prefer
not to use the urban/rural status of localities as recorded in surveys because (i) countries do not
use the same denition for urban areas, and (ii) this precludes distinguishing peri-urban rural
areas from more isolated ones.
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The same is found for Mali in the 75 km bandwidth, except that here the border
is farther away from Abidjan than from Bamako by approximately 300 km (top
panel of table A.1). On both sides, as seen in gure 1, very few PSUs are found
on the western part, which is underpopulated, probably due to the prevalence
of parasitic diseases. Again, withdrawing the two or three most western PSUs
(above longitude 7W) is innocuous. When enlarging the bandwidth to 100 km,
additional Ivorian PSUs are found to lie relatively farther away from the border
in the South. Their inclusion produces a signicant \matching RD" discontinuity
in rainfall. This leads us to prefer the narrower 75 km bandwidth.
Table 1: Geographical variables at the border of Co^te d'Ivoire with Ghana
Border RD Polynomial RD Matching RD
Bandwidth in km: 50 75 50 75 50 75
Relative PSU weightsa -0.25 -0.14 -0.35* -0.19 -0.06 -0.13
(0.20) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.41) (0.30)
Rainfall (mm per day)b +.028 +.012 -.008 -.011 -.011 -.005
(.020) (.021) (.006) (.007) (.006) (.005)
Elevation (meters) +25 +25 +20 +19 +0 -1
(37) (25) (32) (23) (22) (16)
Dist. nearest river (km) -1.5 -1.1 +4.0 +3.5 +0.1 -1.5
(8.9) (6.6) (6.4) (5.3) (5.4) (4.0)
Dist. city 5,000+ 1960 (km) +14.1 -3.7 -3.2 -8.3 +6.9 +0.2
(16.0) (15.7) (20.0) (16.9) (30.3) (23.4)
Dist. city 5,000+ 1990 (km) -6.3 -13.5 -18.1 -21.3 -5.9 -10.4
(11.0) (8.8) (11.9) (12.8) (15.1) (11.9)
Pop. density 1990 (inh./km2) -5.9 -17.5 +3.7 -17.7 -6.3 -4.4
(11.2) (26.3) (10.3) (12.9) (7.6) (9.7)
Dist. capital city (km) -131*** -136*** -150*** -153*** -137*** -140***
(14) (14) (13) (13) (22) (19)
Source: Authors' analysis based on data described in the text.
Coverage: PSUs in the bandwidth window (50 or 75 km from the corresponding border).
Notes: See equations (2), (3), and (4) for each estimator. For \Border RD" and \Matching RD", the only
control variable is latitude.
a: Probabilistic weights with means standardized to one on each side of the border. Non-weighted estimates.
b: Average over the 1984{2001 period.
Positive numbers indicate dierences in favor of Co^te d'Ivoire. Standard errors in parentheses.
***: p < :01; **: p < :05 ; *: p < :10
In both the Ghana and Mali cases, the Co^te d'Ivoire side is slightly more
urbanized. Although not signicantly so, Ivorian localities lie closer to the regional
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cities of 1990 by 6 to 21 (Ghana border, table 1) or 7 to 13 km (Mali border,
table A.1), depending on the estimates. However, the BDs are reversed when
considering the distance to locations that were already cities in 1960, especially
at the Mali border. We link this post-independence urbanization process to the
rapid economic growth of Co^te d'Ivoire and, more locally, to the expansion of either
cocoa (Ghana) or cotton (Mali) production. Lower population density on the Mali
side could also be linked to the persistence of "river blindness" (onchocerciasis),
which was previously fought and eradicated in Co^te d'Ivoire.
Finally, in the case of Guinea, half of the alignment is based on rivers; \parts
of watercourses, from map evidence, are tortuous, indecisive and many-armed"
(Brownlie 1979, 374). The southern part of this border is also rather mountainous.
A few discontinuities are found for elevation and distance to rivers that could
put the BD estimates in question. We give it less weight in our comments and
conclusions. However, no discontinuity in welfare will be identied at this border.
III. Data and main results
After a short presentation of the survey data, we analyze border discontinuities in
development outcome variables.
Survey data on development outcomes
We gather a database composed of 15 multi-topic household surveys: seven for
Co^te d'Ivoire, six for Ghana, one for Mali, and one for Guinea. These surveys were
implemented between 1986 and 1998 (table A.2). We mainly use \income surveys",
which correspond to the frame of Living Standard Measurement Surveys (LSMS),
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as designed by the World Bank in the 1980s. These surveys allow the measurement
of consumption and income sources, and we code the geographical location of PSUs
with precision using the locality name. We complement these income surveys with
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), which do not measure consumption but
record anthropometric data as well as housing conditions. All sample designs are
two-stage and regionally stratied, and each PSU contains between 12 and 25
households.
We choose to analyze four dierent welfare outcomes: consumption per capita,
children's height-for-age, access to electricity, and access to a man-made source of
water. Despite the multi-topical nature of these surveys, very few other welfare
outcomes are usable for comparison.
First, we construct a household expenditure variable that includes all current
expenditures, such as food, clothing, transportation, housing, and imputed rents,
and expenditures for education. We only exclude overly infrequent or badly mea-
sured expenditures such as those in health, durable goods, and transfers. Except
for Mali, we also compute the value of the consumption of own food production,
which we add to household expenditures to obtain a total consumption variable.
We use monthly data on the national consumer price index and express individ-
ual household consumption at 1988 or 1993 prices. Comparisons of household
consumption levels are made in US dollars at 1988 or 1993 exchange rates and
prices.7 We consider one important component of agricultural income, household
production of the three main cash crops produced in the region: cocoa, coee and
cotton. We retain the value of output sold, either as directly reported by the house-
holds (Ghana and Guinea borders) or as physical quantities priced at the ocial
7For more details on the construction of variables, see section S2 of the supplemental appendix.
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and uniform producer price (Mali border; the Malian survey only records physi-
cal cotton output). We also extract data on wage incomes earned by household
members.
Second, height stature is available for children from six months to four years
(59 months) of age, and only for 6-35 months in some DHS. We construct height-
for-age Z-scores using the World Health Organization standards (WHO 2006) and
code children as stunted when the Z-score is below -2.
Third, from both types of surveys, we construct a dummy variable indicating
whether the household uses electricity as the main source of light in the house.
The surveys do not distinguish between being connected to a network or using a
private generator.
Fourth and last, a second dummy variable codes whether the household has
access to a man-made source of water (i.e., any source of water other than rivers,
lakes, pools, or rainfalls) (Ghana border only).
The border with Ghana
For the 1986{8 period, both national accounts and income surveys provide similar
gures for consumption per capita in the two countries. Co^te d'Ivoire appears
wealthier than Ghana by a large 344-375 USD gap at 1988 prices and exchange
rates (table 2, upper top panel). Cocoa and coee income gures computed from
FAO data and from surveys are also quite consistent. When restricting the com-
parison of survey means to the sub-sample of administrative districts lying along
the boundary, the gap in consumption is slightly reduced but remains as large as
282 USD, whereas the cash crop income dierence widens to +174 USD because
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the Ivorian side is a very important cocoa and coee production area. The year
1993 marked the climax of an enormous macroeconomic crisis in Co^te d'Ivoire,
triggered by the collapse of international prices for cocoa and coee in 1987 and
the halving of administered producer prices in 1990. In contrast, Ghana began a
progressive recovery from two decades of economic and political turmoil. In the
case of Co^te d'Ivoire, survey gures exhibit a greater fall than national accounts
(table 2, lower top panel). This may be due to under-reporting biases in the
less detailed 1992{3 survey and/or to the inaccuracy of national accounts, which
compute private consumption as a residual. Co^te d'Ivoire remains the wealthiest
country, even in border districts, where a signicant gap of +76 USD per capita
is observed. Cash crops' income dierences remain statistically signicant but are
ten-fold lower (+17 USD). Unfortunately, the absence of geographical coordinates
in the 1992 Ghanaian income survey prevents us from using these consumption
and income gures for the computation of BDs.
The BD estimates are reported in table 3, again for the two periods of 1986{8
(top panel) and 1993 (bottom panel), and for the set of four welfare indicators.
Column (1) reports the dierence between survey means at the national level, and
columns (2a) to (4b), respectively, report the BD obtained when implementing
our three estimation methods with two bandwidths, 50 or 75 km, as in table 1. In
1986{8, we are able to restrict the estimates to the sub-sample of heads born in
border administrative districts and in the country of residence. This allows us to
test whether discontinuities hold among people sharing the same region of origin
or \ethnicity" because part of the above-mentioned literature is concerned with
this dimension, especially the fact that shared preferences or intense trade ows
may equalize welfare among ethnic groups. We favor the district of birth variable
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Table 2: National accounts and Survey means: Co^te d'Ivoire, Ghana and Mali
Co^te d'Ivoire Ghana Di.e
1986{8
Ocial: Consumptiona per cap. 651 308 +344
Survey: Consumptionb per cap. 665 290 +375***
Idem in border districtsd 593 311 +282***
Ocial: Cocoa + Coeec prod. income p.c. 123 10 +113
Survey: Cocoa + Coee income per cap. 95 8 +87***
Idem in border districtsd 192 18 +174***
1993
Ocial: Consumptiona per cap. 505 341 +164
Survey: Consumptionb per cap. 417 323 +94***
Idem in border districtsd 350 274 +76***
Ocial: Cocoa + Coeec prod. income p.c. 42 7 +35
Survey: Cocoa + Coee income p.c. 29 5 +24***
Idem in border districtsd 30 13 +17***
Co^te d'Ivoire Mali Di.e
1993
Ocial: Consumptiona per cap. 575 237 +338
Survey: Cash expendituresb per cap. 395 174 +221***
Idem in border districtsd 188 79 +110***
Ocial: Cottonc income per cap. 5 8 +2
Survey: Cotton income per cap. 7 7 0
Idem in border districtsd 57 14 +43***
Source: Authors' analysis based on data described in the text.
Notes: Figures in US dollars. Top panel (Ghana): 1988 prices and exchange rates. Bottom panel (Mali): 1993
prices and exch. rates. 1986{8: Averages of 1986{8.
a: National accounts household nal consumption expenditure per capita.Source: World Bank 2012.
b: Top panel (Ghana): Household consumption per capita, including consumed own food production. Bottom
panel (Mali): Household cash expenditures per capita.
c: Cocoa beans, green coee, or seed cotton output multiplied by the corresponding producer price and divided
by total population. Source: FAOSTAT 2012.
d: Administrative districts lying along the border. Ghana border: Abengourou, Aboisso, Agnibilekrou,
Bondoukou, Tanda (Co^te d'Ivoire side); Western and Brong-Ahafo (Ghana side). Mali border: Boundiali,
Ferkessedougou, Korhogo, Odienne, and Tingrela; Bougouni, Kadiolo, Kolondieba and Yanfolila. See also map
S2.1 in the supplemental online appendix.
e: Dierence between the rst and second columns. For survey means comparisons, errors are clustered by
PSUs: ***: p < :01; **: p < :05 ; *: p < :10
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over the Akan ethnic group variable because the GLSS1 survey for 1987 Ghana
has many (non-random) missing values for ethnicity.
Table 3: Discontinuities at the border of Co^te d'Ivoire with Ghana
Nat. Linear RD Polynomial Matching
Bandwidth in km: 50 75 50 75 50 75
(1) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
1986{8
Log. Consumption p. c. +0.75*** +0.74*** +0.64*** +0.79*** +0.65*** +0.68*** +0.68***
(0.04) (0.23) (0.15) (0.23) (0.15) (0.07) (0.07)
Head born in bordera +0.85*** +0.68*** +0.93*** +0.70*** +0.77*** +0.72***
(0.18) (0.14) (0.18) (0.15) (0.05) (0.04)
Log. Expenditures p. c. +0.82*** +0.57* +0.67*** +0.70** +0.57** +0.54*** +0.65***
(0.07) (0.34) (0.25) (0.30) (0.24) (0.13) (0.12)
Head born in bordera +0.45 +0.49** +0.65** +0.47* +0.41** +0.54***
(0.28) (0.22) (0.26) (0.24) (0.16) (0.10)
Stunted 6-59 m. (%) -12*** -38*** -25*** -44*** -35*** -37*** -29***
(1) (8) (8) (9) (9) (6) (3)
Head born in bordera -33*** -11 -35*** -23*** -26*** -17***
(8) (7) (9) (8) (4) (2)
Stunted 6-35 m. (%) -6*** -26*** -16** -32*** -27*** -28*** -21***
(2) (7) (6) (9) (8) (5) (3)
Electricity connection (%) +17*** +34 +48** +29 +33* +31 +36**
(4) (34) (22) (32) (19) (19) (16)
Access to safe water (%) +37*** +43 +26 +35* +15 +25* +31***
(3) (29) (16) (22) (20) (14) (8)
N C.d'Iv./ N Ghana 199/344 14/25 19/40 14/25 19/40 14/25 19/40
1993
Stunted 6-35 m. (%) +4*** -1 -6 -1 -4 +8 +6
(2) (10) (9) (9) (8) (8) (7)
Electricity connection (%) +12*** +35*** +36*** +22* +28** +26** +26**
(3) (13) (10) (12) (12) (12) (12)
Access to safe water (%) +21*** +44*** +24* +36** +41*** +45*** +28***
(3) (15) (13) (14) (13) (8) (9)
N C.d'Iv./ N Ghanab 714/401 61/29 83/47 61/29 83/47 61/29 83/47
Source: Authors' analysis based on data described in the text.
Coverage: PSUs in the bandwidth window (50 or 75 km from the corresponding border).
Notes: Consumption and expenditures at 1988 prices and exchange rates. Col. (2a) to (4b): controls for
latitude, rainfalls, elevation, and distance to river are always included.
a: Head born in border: Household head is born in a district lying along the border (see table 2 footnote d).
b: Income survey pooled with DHS data on the Co^te d'Ivoire side, DHS only on the Ghana side.
Positive numbers indicate dierences in favor of Co^te d'Ivoire. Standard errors in parentheses.
***: p < :01; **: p < :05 ; *: p < :10
In 1986{8, signicant BDs are found for log consumption per capita, ranging
from +0.64 to +0.93 (i.e., indicating large income gaps at the border of the two
countries) even if we restrict to households whose head is a native of border dis-
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tricts. BDs for log cash expenditures support the same conclusions, although they
are lower on average (+0.41 to +0.70).
Although we discuss the channels driving these results in more detail in section
IV, we need to assess the role of dierences in price levels because discontinuities
in \nominal" consumption may not match discontinuities in purchasing power.
According to theWorld Bank (2012), in 1988, the price level of private consumption
in Co^te d'Ivoire was 0.98 that of Ghana, whereas according to the Penn World
Tables 7.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten 2012), it was 1.09 at ocial 1988 exchange
rates (i.e., 298 CFA francs and 202 cedis for one US dollar, respectively). After
1983, the Ghanaian government began a gradual process of devaluation of the cedi
that ended with free oat in 1990 and the elimination of the black market premium.
In 1988, the parallel market exchange rate was estimated at 252 cedis/USD.8 Using
this parallel exchange rate instead of the ocial one would enhance the border
discontinuities in consumption by a factor of 1.25 (=252/202). Thus, it is hardly
plausible that the real exchange rate holding in border areas could reverse the
conclusion of a large discontinuity in real consumption per capita.9
Furthermore, the gures for the share of stunted children are consistent with the
Co^te d'Ivoire advantage in consumption. For children six months to four years of
age, we nd large and robust BDs, ranging between 19 and 44 percentage points,
with only one exception (linear RD with 75 km bw and heads born in border
districts). For the sub-sample of younger children (6 to 35 months), the point
8Data from Robert Bates, Karen Feree, James Habyarimana, Macartan Humphreys, and
Smita Singh. 2001. \Economic Data (updated 2005)", http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/14978
UNF:5:8vHsoDT1Q8sUbiTZgDkctw== Murray Research Archive [Distributor] V1 [Version].
9In a completely dierent context, Gopinath, Gourinchas, Hsieh, and Li (2011) nd retail and
wholesale markets to be segmented at the border between Canada and US. However, relative
prices co-move with the nominal exchange rate, so there is little room for changes in the real
exchange rate.
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estimates lie between 16 and 32 pp. In 1993, which is when income dierences at
the border must have been reduced to a minimum (see table 2 and above), BDs in
early-age stunting are no longer observed. For Co^te d'Ivoire, Cogneau and Jedwab
(2012) found that the 1990 drastic cut in cocoa producer prices had a large impact
on the height of two- to ve-year-olds, less so on the youngest.
Finally, BDs for access to electricity seem large in magnitude for most esti-
mates; they are always above 29 percentage points in 1986{8 but suer from a
lack of precision when the smallest 50 km bandwidth is used. BDs for access to
safe water are positive but even less precise. With larger sample sizes on the Co^te
d'Ivoire side in 1992{3, both are found to lie in the same range and display higher
statistical signicance.10 The results are not shown for the year 1998; despite
a small sample on the Ivorian side (11 PSUs only), the results seem to conrm
the persistence of the relative superiority of Co^te d'Ivoire over Ghana in terms of
utilities.11
The northern borders
We now turn to the northern borders of Co^te d'Ivoire with Mali and, secondarily,
Guinea.12
Although 1993 was a very bad year for Co^te d'Ivoire, the macroeconomic g-
ures in table 2 show that this country was still far above Mali in terms of household
10Using DHS data only and for the 75 km bw, the results are similar, although again less
precise due to the smaller sample size (for electricity connection: +44**, +40*, +35; for water
safety: +27*, +44***, +32**).
11For the 75 km bw and for 1998, the results for electricity connection are +81***, +63***,
+48**; for water safety: +30*, +20, +19**.
12In previous versions of this work, we also looked at the border with Burkina Faso. However
identication had drawbacks due to sample size and distribution. Borders between northern
neighbors were also studied. See supplemental appendix section S3.
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consumption per capita, by around +300 USD at 1993 exchange rates and prices.
This national account gure is consistent with the survey means comparison for
cash expenditures (+221 USD dierence), although with some caveats already
mentioned. When focusing on administrative districts along the border, the ad-
vantage of the Co^te d'Ivoire side is halved but remains signicant at approximately
+110 USD. Even if cotton output per capita was fairly comparable at the national
level, the Malian border districts produced very little cotton in 1993, providing a
+43 USD per capita advantage to Ivorian districts.
Particularly because of its bauxite resources, Guinea is wealthier than Mali,
and the dierence from Co^te d'Ivoire only reaches +200 USD in consumption per
capita (not shown). Furthermore, although mines are not located in the border
areas, survey mean comparisons among border districts show that the Guinean
side is no poorer than the Ivorian side (not shown).
At the Mali border, discontinuities in log cash expenditures per capita are even
higher than those found at the border with Ghana, ranging from +0.84 to +2.02
depending on the estimates, the bandwidth used, and the population considered
(table 4 top panel). Recall, however, that the narrower 75 km bandwidth can
be deemed more reliable for identication (see above). With this bandwidth, the
upper bound is decreased to +1.52. The restriction to household heads who are
from the Mande-Voltaic group again slightly reduces the estimates by dropping a
few Ivorian southerners, such as civil servants sent to the North.13 When we ad-
13The Mande include, in particular, the Bambara, Bobo, Diula, Malinke, and Soussou, whereas
the Voltaic or Gur include the Lobi, Mossi, and Senoufo people. The Mande and Voltaic groups
are close together in linguistic terms and display some mixing on the map. Ethnic codications
are not homogeneous; in particular, the Malian survey records the language of interview rather
than the \ethnic group". However, district of birth is only recorded in the Co^te d'Ivoire survey,
so we have no alternative.
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ditionally withdraw international migrants (i.e., mainly relatively wealthy Malian
migrants to Ivorian regional cities such as Korhogo), a slight attenuation is again
observed, but the BDs still range between +0.8 and +1.2.
Table 4: Discontinuities at the border of Co^te d'Ivoire with Mali and Guinea
Nat. Linear RD Polynomial Matching
Bandwidth in km: 75 100 75 100 75 100
(1) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
1993 Co^te d'Ivoire / Mali
Log. Expenditures p. c. +0.89*** +0.91 +1.41** +0.90** +1.06* +1.52*** +2.02***
(0.07) (0.59) (0.68) (0.34) (0.59) (0.64) (0.49)
Head "Mande-Voltaic"a +0.93 +1.51** +0.87** +1.18** +1.39** +1.88***
(0.55) (0.66) (0.30) (0.54) (0.61) (0.49)
Head "Mande-V." & nationala +0.84 +1.45** +0.76** +1.10** +1.21* +1.70***
(0.56) (0.67) (0.35) (0.55) (0.61) (0.50)
Stunted 6-59 m. (%) +2 -13* -3 -21*** -16*** -20** -16**
(2) (7) (9) (6) (6) (7) (8)
Head "Mande-Voltaic"a -14** -7 -21*** -16*** -18** -16**
(7) (9) (5) (5) (8) (8)
Head "Mande-V." & nationala -13* -4 -17* -15** -18** -16
(7) (12) (9) (7) (8) (11)
Electricity connection (%) +36*** +10 +9 +15 +16 -1 +1
(2) (11) (13) (15) (12) (6) (12)
N C. d'Iv. / N Mali 468/473 13/11 32/31 13/11 32/31 13/11 32/31
1993 Co^te d'Ivoire / Guinea
Log. Expenditures p. c. +0.44*** -0.03 -0.28 -0.08 +0.31 -0.07 -0.42
(0.07) (0.53) (0.64) (0.68) (0.62) (0.32) (0.38)
Stunted 6-59 m. (%) +12*** +23 +29 +14 +5 +11 +17
(2) (22) (22) (16) (19) (11) (17)
Electricity connection (%) +21*** +30 +14 +11 +35* +10 +9
(3) (20) (22) (14) (21) (6) (8)
N C.d'Iv. / N Guinea 468/312 27/22 37/28 27/22 37/28 27/22 37/28
Source: Authors' analysis based on data described in the text.
Coverage: PSUs in the bandwidth window (50 or 75 km from the corresponding border).
Notes: In the cases of \Border RD" and \Matching RD" and for 100 km bandwidth (col. 2b & 4b), sample sizes
allow for using a quadratic in distance to border rather than a simple linear specication. Col. (2a) to (4b):
controls for longitude (Mali) or latitude (Guinea), rainfalls, elevation, and distance to river are always included.
a: Head from a Mande or a Voltaic linguistic group. National: excluding foreign immigrants.
Positive numbers indicate dierences in favor of Co^te d'Ivoire. Standard errors in parentheses.
***: p < :01; **: p < :05 ; *: p < :10
Here, monetary welfare comparisons are facilitated by the fact that the two
countries share the same currency, namely the CFA franc. We acknowledge that
the BDs in nominal consumption may mix discontinuities in real terms and in
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price levels. However, although cattle is a traditional export of northern countries
and kola nut is a traditional export of forested Co^te d'Ivoire, many goods ow
one way or another across the border depending on market demand (e.g., cereals
such as rice or millet, textiles, spare parts, etc.), so persistent price dierentials
should be limited (Labazee 1993). At the national level, World Bank (2012) gures
for the year 1993 indicate that the price level of private consumption was lower
in Mali by a factor of 0.81; Heston, Summers, and Aten (2012) report a ratio
of 0.75. Even if they prevailed at the border, these orders of magnitude would
not cancel out the large BDs in real consumption. The devaluation of the CFA
franc in 1994 creates an additional diculty in the comparison because the Malian
income survey was implemented in the middle of this year (between March and
June), whereas the Ivorian survey was conducted over 1992 and 1993. As already
mentioned, monthly prices were used to correct for ination. The average deator
for cash expenditures in Mali (i.e., the ratio of 1993 prices to current prices) is
0.90, indicating a 10% ination rate six months after the 50% devaluation. Again,
we checked that the Co^te d'Ivoire advantage was preserved even when we do not
deate the consumption and income variables for Mali.
Furthermore, the BDs for the share of stunted children are again consistent
with consumption gures, whereas no dierence in national averages is observed.
In addition to income, climate and ecology strongly determine height in Africa
(Moradi 2012). In West Africa, all anthropometric data conrm that people from
the savannah are taller than people from the forest because of the protein intake
they obtain from milk and meat (cattle breeding is constrained in the South by
the presence of the tsetse y). In the Malian survey, children from the North were
taller than children born close to the Co^te d'Ivoire border. Thus, when restricting
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the comparison to the same ecological area, we recover large BDs in nutrition:
within our preferred 75 km bandwidth, children from the Co^te d'Ivoire side are
13 to 21 pp less likely to be stunted. The next section will provide some evidence
that the bulk of this discontinuity can be explained by parental income.
Finally, whereas the average Ivorian household is 36 pp more likely to have
electricity compared to its Malian counterparts (col.1), we nd no evidence of a
discontinuity in electrication at the border.
In the case of the border with Guinea, no BDs in consumption per capita,
stunting, or access to electricity are found (bottom panel of table 4).
IV. The role of public policies
We argue that two main factors determine the presence or absence of discontinuities
in welfare at the borders of Co^te d'Ivoire with its neighbors. The rst factor
lies in the public policies that regulate the cash crop sectors (here, cocoa, coee,
and cotton), either through administered producer prices or through agricultural
extension and subsidies to production. The second factor is public investment,
either national or local, in infrastructures and utilities such as electricity and safe
water.
Because cash crop income is mainly derived from rural areas, whereas utilities
initially reach cities, we introduce the urban structure into the analysis. This
approach also allows us to test the robustness of our BD estimates. We use a
variable already considered in the subsection dedicated to geography, the distance
to cities with more than 5,000 inhabitants in 1990. Due to sample size constraints,
we only distinguish two urbanization classes: 0 to 5 km from a city and 5 km or
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more. We then compute new \matching RD" estimates with PSUs matched with
the nearest neighbor from the same class.14 We report matching RD estimates
for the whole sample ("All") and for the sample restricted to remote rural areas
("5+"); we do this for our preferred 75 km bandwidth. The results show that the
\All" and \5+" estimates look very much the same. Indeed, cities or peri-urban
areas ("0-5") are seldom found close to the borders, and it is mainly dierences
between remote rural areas that "make" the border discontinuities (table 5). In
addition to this \urban/rural" breakdown, we report BD estimates for cash crop
output and income.
At the border with Ghana (1986{8), BDs in log cash expenditures are very
robust to the breakdown between urban/peri-urban (0-5 km) and remote rural (5+
km) localities. For the whole sample (col.1a), the matching RD estimate of +0.62
compares with the initial nding of +0.65 in table 3 col.(4b). When restricting
to rural areas (col.1b), it decreases to +0.52 but remains highly signicant. At
the border with Mali (1993), where a large majority of PSUs is rural, the same
restriction leads ato a signicant BD of +0.86 in log cash expenditures (col.2b). At
the border of Guinea (1993{4), it is still the case that no discontinuity is detected
(col.3).
We now turn to cash crop output and income.
At the Ghana border, no discontinuity in cocoa output is detected; both sides
are important cocoa production areas at that time.15 However, the real producer
price for cocoa in Co^te d'Ivoire is more than twice that of Ghana: at 1988 prices,
14For the rest, the estimation is kept the same; see equation (4). In the case of the Mali border,
where only ve urban or peri-urban PSUs are found in the 75 bandwidth, we match these ve
PSUs with the nearest neighbor, regardless of its urbanization class. See also table 5 footnote.
15At the national level, the Ivorian superiority in cocoa output is due to the younger trees of
the central and western regions, not to the eastern border area.
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Table 5: The cash crops channel
Ghana Mali Guinea
1986{8 1993 1993
Distance to city in km: All 5 + All 5 + All
Bandwidth in km: 75 75 75 75 75
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3)
Log. Expenditures per capita +0.62*** +0.52*** +1.52*** +0.86** -0.22
(0.13) (0.13) (0.64) (0.31) (0.22)
Main cash cropc output p.c. (kg) +29 +23 +733*** +664*** +9**
(30) (46) (211) (84) (3)
Cash cropsb income p.c. (USD)a +194*** +184*** +237*** +214*** +16***
(43) (65) (68) (27) (2)
Cash Expenditures per capita (USD)a +177*** +120** +173** +117*** +2
(52) (48) (61) (38) (37)
Cash crops inc. controlledd +135 -2 +48 -13 +63
(99) (77) (56) (32) (64)
Cash crops & wage inc. controllede +21 -1 +39 -13 -31
(53) (65) (53) (39) (20)
Stunted 6-59 months (%) -26*** -32*** -20** -24*** +16
(6) (5) (7) (7) (13)
Expend. per cap. controlledf -10 -8 -5 -8 +14
(7) (5) (12) (14) (13)
Electricity connectiong (%) +28** +22* -2 -6 +0
(13) (11) (6) (4) (4)
N 19/40 10/30 13/11 10/9 27/22
Source: Authors' analysis based on data described in the text.
Coverage: PSUs in the 75 km bandwidth window.
Notes: \Matching RD" estimates with 75 km bandwidth. PSUs are matched to the nearest neighbor on the
other side of the border within the same urbanization class: 0-5 km or 5+ km from the nearest city (5,000 +
inhabitants) as of 1990. Matched dierences are then analyzed as in equation (4) (see text). In the case of the
Mali border, where only 5 PSUs are in the 0-5 km class, the \All" estimate (col.2a) does not match PSUs
according to class, it is therefore exactly the same as in Table 4 col. (4a). Controls for latitude (Ghana and
Guinea) or longitude (Mali), rainfalls, elevation, and distance to river are always included.
a: 1988 prices and exchange rates in columns (1a-b); 1993 prices and exchange rates in col. (2a-b) and (3).
b: Cocoa and coee sales in (1a-b) and (3); Cotton output valued at ocial producer price in (2a-b).
c: Cocoa output sold in col. (1a-b) and (3); Cotton output in col. (2a-b). Kilograms per capita.
d: Cash expenditures per capita border discontinuity, with cash crop income per capita added as a control.
e: Idem d, with instead the sum of cash crop and wage income per capita as a control.
f: Stunted children discontinuity, with cash expenditures per capita and its square added as controls.
g: At the border with Ghana in 1992{3 and for electricity connection: 'All': +30** (s.e. 13); '5+': +37** (16).
Positive numbers indicate dierences in favor of Co^te d'Ivoire. Standard errors in parentheses.
***: p < :01; **: p < :05 ; *: p < :10
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the average real producer price for 1986{8 is 1.55 USD per kg in the former country
compared with 0.65 in the latter. In contrast, in the case of coee, a large BD in
output is observed because this crop is not produced in Ghana due to historically
low administered producer prices in this country. Among rural villages, we there-
fore nd a large BD in cocoa and coee income of +184 USD per capita (table
5, col. 1b). Additional disaggregation (not shown) shows that cocoa accounts for
two-thirds and coee for the remaining one-third. Before 1990, the cocoa producer
price dierential generated a strong incentive to smuggle cocoa beans across the
Co^te d'Ivoire border (Bulr 1998). However, our BD result suggests that smuggling
was not widespread enough to equalize incomes across the border. When the cash
crop income variable is added as a control in the BD estimates, the BD in cash ex-
penditures that prevails among rural villages is strikingly erased, decreasing from
+120 USD to a negligible -2 USD. Recall that expenditures and income gures
are drawn from two independent parts of the surveys' questionnaires.16 When
including cities and peri-urban villages (col. 1a), the cash expenditure disconti-
nuity is only reduced from +177 to +135 USD, although it becomes statistically
insignicant. However, if we add formal wage income earned by household mem-
bers to cash crop income, then controlling for this new income variable successfully
reduces the cash expenditures BD to a low and insignicant +21 USD.17
At the Mali border, we detect a very large BD in cotton output per capita
of +664 kg per capita among rural villages (col.2b). In contrast with the Ghana
16This procedure involves assuming that (i) the same saving rate applies to cash crop income
on both border sides and (ii) this saving rate is consistently estimated by OLS.
17In 1986{8, the survey gures for the average annual wage of civil servants and public rms
workers reached 5,223 USD in Co^te d'Ivoire compared with 663 USD in Ghana. For private rm
workers, they were 3,498 USD and 540 USD, respectively. The minimum wage in Co^te d'Ivoire
(1,400 USD) was also six times higher than in Ghana (240 USD).
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border, the BD in cotton income mainly stems from a higher output on the Co^te
d'Ivoire side because producer prices are only slightly higher (90 vs. 85 CFA
franc per kg in Mali). Further, this Ivorian advantage is specic to the border
area; both national ocial sales and survey gures show that the two countries
produced roughly the same quantities of cotton (see table 2). In fact, the Mali side
of the border was not yet producing signicant quantities of cotton. In this country,
cotton production historically began more northward, around the city of Koutiala,
and mostly took o in the mid-1970s. As in Co^te d'Ivoire, it was strongly regulated
and subsidized by the State through a parastatal company (Compagnie Malienne
de Developpement des Textiles). We can again explain the BD in consumption
among rural villages by the discontinuity in cash crop income. As in the case of
Ghana (with cocoa and coee), when controlling for cotton income, the BD in cash
expenditures decreases from +117 USD to an insignicant -13. Unreported results
also show that richer farmers invest in cattle. We identify BDs in the number
of cows owned by the household (+1.76, s.e.= 0.32) as well as in the number
of goats and sheep (+0.53, s.e.=0.10). Dierences in public health policies may
also be involved because the ght against parasitic diseases (river blindness or
onchocerciasis, sleeping sickness or trypanosomiasis) was undertaken much earlier
in Co^te d'Ivoire.
At the Guinea border, although almost no cocoa and approximately half as
much coee is grown on the Guinea side, the BD in cash crops income is small but
statistically signicant (+16 USD). In comparison with the Ghana and Mali cases,
we argue that the absence of a large dierence in cash crop income may account
for why no border discontinuity is found in consumption per capita or in children's
stunting.
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Regarding this latter variable, table 5 also suggests that a large part of the BDs
can be accounted for by household consumption. In the Ghana case, controlling
for cash expenditures per capita and its square reduces the BD in stunting from -32
among rural villages (-26 in the whole sample) to an insignicant -8 percent (-10
in the whole sample). In the Mali case, the same dramatic reduction is observed,
from -24 in rural villages to -8 percent (-20 to -5 in the whole sample). Combined
with the results obtained on the impact of cash crop income, this last result lends
some support to the idea that the cash crop channel explains most of the border
discontinuities in both household consumption and child nutrition.
In the Ghana case, electricity reaches border rural villages on the Co^te d'Ivoire
side, whereas none of their Ghanaian counterparts is connected. This simple fact
translates into a signicant +22-percentage-point BD (+28 pp in the whole sample,
see last row of table 5). In 1993, these BDs were reinforced: +37 pp in rural areas
and +30 in the whole sample (see table 5 footnote). The same features are found
for access to safe water. In contrast, at the two other borders, all remote rural
areas are in the dark. Although Ivorian regional cities are more connected to
electricity than their northern counterparts, they are too far from the border to
signicantly contribute to the BDs. In explaining these features, it is dicult to
disentangle a pure wealth eect from a more discretionary uneven allocation of
public investment.18
Recent history shows that price policies were reverted during structural ad-
justment under pressure from donors. In 1989{90, Co^te d'Ivoire halved both its
cocoa and coee producer prices before raising them again after the CFA franc
18Although wealthier, northern Ivorian households may not be wealthy enough to pay for
electricity connection.
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devaluation in 1994. In the meantime, Ghana signicantly raised its cocoa pro-
ducer price so that the dierence between the two countries became negligible at
the end of the 1990s. Changes in cash crop production were slower, but they also
occurred. Between 1994 and 2001, Mali more than doubled its cotton production
in the South through the extensive cultivation of new lands; however, the cultiva-
tion of cotton had not yet reached the most southern border area (Dufumier and
Bainville 2006). In contrast, the Ivorian \cocoa frontier" has moved westward and
today reaches the southern Guinea border. With these developments, some of the
border discontinuities that we identied for the 1990s may have changed. After
2002, the civil war in Co^te d'Ivoire and the ve-year partition between North and
South may have further reduced the Ivorian advantage at the northern borders,
at least until 2007. In the South, Ghana continued to catch up with its neighbor
(Eberhardt and Teal 2010). Hence, although infrastructure showed greater per-
sistence in 1993 and in 1998, border dierences may have been attenuated since
then. Unfortunately, the data that we gathered do not cover those more recent
economic conditions.
V. Conclusion
The borders between Co^te d'Ivoire and its neighbors divide fairly comparable ar-
eas in terms of geography, anthropology, and precolonial history. At the end of
the 1980s and in the 1990s, Co^te d'Ivoire was by far the wealthiest country, par-
ticularly because of its export crops. By applying regression discontinuity designs
to a set of household surveys, we show that this higher wealth was translated at
the borders with Ghana and Mali in the form of large and consistent discontinu-
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ities in consumption and in child stunting. We provide evidence for the fact that
the bulk of these border discontinuities can be explained by cash crop production
and/or pricing policies. At the border of Guinea, where no economically signi-
cant discontinuity is found in cash crop income, no discontinuity in consumption
or nutrition is detected either. At the border of Ghana, we also identify persistent
border discontinuities in access to electricity and safe water, even among rural vil-
lages, linked to high public investment in southern Co^te d'Ivoire. At the northern
borders, electricity only reaches Ivorian cities, not rural areas.
Thus, we obtain a balanced conclusion. National borders in West Africa are
not highly porous, abstract lines with no impact on the welfare of the communi-
ties across them. However, our analysis suggests that border discontinuities reect
reversible public policies rather than intangible institutional traits (although polit-
ical and structural factors can account for how long it takes to change policies). In
rural areas, the discontinuities in consumption stem from dierences in cash crop
output and earnings. These dierences are not necessarily permanent, and they
changed during the two past decades because of policy shifts, political shocks, and
medium-term agronomic developments. We hope that we have shown that border
discontinuities in welfare were observed in the past and may continue to mirror
the dierences between national policies in the future.
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Appendix Table A.1: Geography at northern borders
Linear RD Polynomial RD Matching RD
Bandwidth in km: 75 100 75 100 75 100
1993 Co^te d'Ivoire / Mali
Relative PSU weightsa -0.19 -0.51 -0.17 -0.73* -0.24 -1.05*
(0.28) (0.88) (0.22) (0.39) (0.21) (0.47)
Rainfall (mm per day)b -.002 +.093 +.062 +.072 +.055 +.110***
(.057) (.086) (.070) (.049) (.030) (.029)
Elevation (meters) -18 -7 +9 +1 +9 +17
(22) (24) (16) (13) (12) (11)
Dist. nearest river (km) -3.8 -5.1 +0.2 -2.6 -2.1 -2.7
(3.7) (4.3) (4.7) (2.8) (2.5) (3.5)
Dist. city 5,000+ 1960 (km) +26.8* +50.3* +19.3 +9.6 +33.5** +46.2**
(13.1) (25.8) (15.6) (11.7) (11.0) (16.0)
Dist. city 5,000+ 1990 (km) -7.8 -6.6 -13.1 -11.6 -10.2 -9.3
(15.7) (20.4) (19.7) (11.8) (17.6) (21.0)
Pop. density 1990 (inh./km2) +11.2** +24.6* +11.5* +17.5*** +7.6 +11.5
(5.0) (13.0) (5.6) (6.4) (6.4) (8.4)
Dist. capital city (km) +290*** +254*** +310*** +301*** +284*** 271***
(28) (37) (30) (23) (47) (56)
1993 Co^te d'Ivoire / Guinea
Relative PSU weightsa -1.01 -0.09 -0.43 -0.27 -0.24 -0.18
(1.30) (1.21) (0.57) (0.52) (0.26) (0.17)
Rainfall (mm per day)b -.029 +.102 +.093 -.084 -.118 -.054
(.087) (.132) (.095) (.079) (.096) (.059)
Elevation (meters) -190** -103 -87 -135** -130 -80
(90) (115) (65) (58) (72) (51)
Dist. nearest river (km) -26.7** -7.4 -9.2 -22.8** -17.5* -7.8
(10.6) (12.6) (10.0) (10.5) (8.5) (6.7)
Dist. city 5,000+ 1960 (km) +9.8 +57.9 +19.9 -23.9 +7.6 +44.1
(35.4) (40.0) (14.6) (28.2) (38.4) (34.8)
Dist. city 5,000+ 1990 (km) +8.3 +1.4 -3.4 -8.3 +2.8 +3.6
(18.3) (23.3) (18.3) (15.3) (9.6) (10.2)
Pop. density 1990 (inh./km2) -26.0 -29.6 +16.8 -4.6 +20.1 -25.7
(20.4) (25.1) (23.2) (17.2) (16.5) (22.6)
Dist. capital city (km) -69*** -93*** -76*** -59*** -60*** -80***
(20) (24) (20) (20) (25) (19)
Source: Authors' analysis based on data described in the text.
Coverage: PSUs in the bandwidth window (75 or 100 km from the corresponding border).
Notes: See equations (2), (3) and (4) for each estimator. For \Border RD" and \Matching RD", the only
control variable is longitude (Mali), or latitude (Guinea). For 100 km bandwidth, sample sizes allow for using a
quadratic in distance to border rather than a simple linear specication.
a, b: See Table 1.
Positive numbers indicate dierences in favor of Co^te d'Ivoire. Standard errors in parentheses.
***: p < :01; **: p < :05 ; *: p < :10
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Appendix Table A.2: Surveys
Country Survey name Survey
type
Period # house-
holds
Geo-
ref.?
1986{8
Co^te d'Ivoire CILSS2-4 IS Feb.86-May.89 4,814 Yes
Ghana GLSS1-2 IS Mar.87-Apr.89 6,336 Yes
1992{4
Co^te d'Ivoire ENV1 IS Apr.92-Oct.93 9,598 Yes
Co^te d'Ivoire DHS 1994 DHS Jun.94-Nov.94 5,914 Yes
Ghana DHS 1993 DHS Sep.93-Feb.94 5,804 Yes
Ghana GLSS3 IS Sep.91-Sep.92 6,336 No
Mali EMCES IS Mar.94-June94 9,554 Yes
Guinea EIBC IS Jan.94-Feb.95 4,417 Yes
1998
Co^te d'Ivoire ENV2 IS Sep.98-Dec.98 4,178 No
Co^te d'Ivoire DHS 1998-99 DHS Sep.98-Mar.99 2,115 Yes
Ghana GLSS4 IS Apr.98-Mar.99 6,016 Yes
Ghana DHS 1998 DHS Nov.98-Feb.99 5,983 Yes
Source: Household survey documents.
Notes: The three rst Ivorian (CILSS 2 to 4) and the two rst Ghanaian (GLSS 1 and 2) surveys are stacked to
obtain large samples covering the 1986{8 period. IS = Income Survey, LSMS-type. DHS= Demographic and
Health Survey.
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Appendix
This appendix is made of three sections, the rst is historical on how borders were drawn
(S1), the second is statistical on how variables were constructed from surveys raw data
(S2), and the third discusses additional results on the border with Burkina Faso and
between Co^te d'Ivoire neighbors (S3).
S1. The alignment of boundaries in colonial times19
S1.1. The border between Co^te d'Ivoire and Ghana
The border area between Co^te d'Ivoire and Ghana stretches from the lagoon regions
bordering the Atlantic Ocean to the savannah in the North. Excepting the lagoon in the
extreme South and the Black Volta river in the extreme North, the major part of the
border we consider does not follow any natural line.
During the 19th century, the bulk of this border area was controlled by the Ashanti
Empire whose capital town Kumasi was located in central present-day Ghana. Then, at
the end of the 19th century, the French and British started to extend their domination,
from trade posts located on the coast toward the North, by signing protectorate treaties
with local kingdoms. The 1870 defeat of France against Prussia allowed Great Britain
to extend its inuence westward. A territorial exchange of the French trade posts of
Grand Bassam and Assinie against British Gambia was even considered at that time.
But the Binger expedition and the action of French men who had private interests in
the region (Treich-Laplene, Verdier) made France regain the lost ground from 1887 by
signing treaties with kingdoms located in the middle part of the border area: Indenie
(around Abengourou), Sefwi (around Debiso), Gyaman. Having signed treaties with
19Excellent research assistance from Marie Bourdaud and Angelique Roblin is gratefully ac-
knowledged.
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both colonial powers, this latter kingdom, located around Bondoukou, was nally cut
in two halves as early as 1891: The city of Bondoukou was rst taken by the British in
1887, then by the French in 1888, then by the Diula leader Samori Toure in 1895; the
British reconquered it in July 1897 when called for help by the king of the Gyaman, but
the French took their revenge and imposed themselves in October 1897.
The two colonial powers needed around 15 years, from 1889 to 1905, to agree upon
a denitive alignment.20 Some consideration was given to historical ties between popu-
lations, but diplomatic bargaining was the dominant feature.21 The 1905 memorandum
recording the agreement between arrived at by the British and French governments
stated that "any natives who may not be satised with the assignment of their village
to one of the two Powers shall have, for the period of one year from the 1st April, 1905,
the right to emigrate to the other side of the frontier"; after that one year delay, the
inhabitants of villages situated near the frontier were no longer authorized to build huts
on the other side 22. So that, in econometric terms, "manipulation of the (country)
treatment" had been very much restricted at that time.
Between 1958 and 1970, a secessionist movement reclaimed the independence of the
Sanwi kingdom in the most southern part of the border on the Co^te d'Ivoire side, with
the alleged support of Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana; this movement was toughly repressed
by Felix Houphouet-Boigny, the leader of independent Co^te d'Ivoire. In 1970, a bilateral
commission reexamined the border alignment and achieved its works in 1976. The layout
of the last demarcation on the eld, with teak trees, beacons and pillars, was achieved
in 1984 on the Co^te d'Ivoire side, and in 1988 on the Ghana side.
20Brownlie, I., 1979. African Boundaries - A Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopaedia, London:
C. Hurst and Company, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, for the Royal
Institute of International Aairs (London), pp. 231-246.
21Stary B., 2003. "Un no man's land forestier de l'artice a l'articialite: l'etatisation de la
frontiere Co^te d'Ivoire-Ghana". Cahiers d'Outre-Mer, 222: 199-228.
22Brownlie, op. cit. p.246
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S1.2. The border between Co^te d'Ivoire and Guinea
The northern part of this border was laid out in the context of the rst war against
the Almami Samori Toure whose "rst empire" was centered on Kankan and extended
southward in present-day Sierra Leone, eastward to Odienne, and northward to the banks
of river Niger near Bamako where the French had just arrived, coming from Senegal.23
Between 1891 and 1894, the French conquered the regions of Kankan and Beyla that were
rst included in French Soudan, then in 1899 merged with the other French conquests
on the Western coast (1893-94) and in the Fouta Djallon mountains (1896-97) to form
the Guinea colony. A sector of this border follows the Feredougouba river.
The southern border area is a forest and mountainous region, which currently corre-
sponds to the districts of Biankouma and Danane in Co^te d'Ivoire, Lola and Nzerekore
in Guinea. The conquest of this remote forest area by the French began from the North:
according to the Berlin treaty this area should have been controlled by Liberia and was
not, so that France invaded it gradually and denitely annexed it in 1907. In 1911, the
region ceased to be a special military zone and was merged with the rest of the Guinea
colony. Because of the resistance from the Guerze people, the French military forces
reached the most southern part of the Co^te d'Ivoire / Guinea border only as late as in
1908.
There is no detailed description of the border alignment between Co^te d'Ivoire and
Guinea, whether in French colonial enactments, or in international agreements since
independence.24 No demarcation is known to have taken place, so that French maps
still provide the best available evidence, revealing that some sectors are still indenite.
However no dispute has ever been reported between the two countries.
23Curtin, P., S. Feierman, L. Thomson and J. Vansina, 1978. African History, From Earliest
Times to Independence, Harlow, England: Longman, 2nd edition 1995, p.349.
24Brownlie, op.cit., pp.301-303.
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S1.3. The borders of Co^te d'Ivoire with Mali and Burkina Faso
In this region, the French were again confronted with the Almami Samori Toure they
had already defeated in 1894 and whom they had pushed to the East (cf. supra on Guinea
border). In 1896, his "second empire" covered all northern Co^te d'Ivoire from the banks
of the Sassandra river (East of Odienne) to Korhogo and Bondoukou, and even extended
to southern Burkina Faso and northern Ghana.25 The northern neighbors of this empire
were the Kenedougou kingdom (capital Sikasso in present-day Mali), Kong and Bouna
kingdoms (with eponymous capital towns in present-day Co^te d'Ivoire). Under the king
Tyeba (1870-1893), the Kenedougou rst fought against Samori whose siege of Sikasso
failed in 1887, and made an alliance with the French. After 1896, Samori rallied his
successor, the king Babemba, by conceding him Tingrela (present-day Co^te d'Ivoire),
before it was nally taken by the French in 1898. Conversely, the Kong chiefs rst
allied with Samori but the latter pillaged Kong city (present-day Co^te d'Ivoire) in May
1897; the Kong chiefs ed to Bobo-Dioulasso (present-day Burkina Faso). Both cities
were taken by the French respectively in December 1897 and February 1898. As for
the Bouna kingdom (Mosi people), formerly a vassal of the Asante Empire, it had rst
signed a protectorate treaty with the British in 1894, then was pillaged by Samori's son
in 1896; Samori rst proposed to give Bouna city to the French, but his son attacked
and destroyed their military forces, so that Bouna was nally reconquered by the British
in November 1897; the French nally entered Bouna in August 1898. Under French
rule, the Bouna kingdom nally lost its integrity: the most important southern part,
around Bouna city, was attached to the Co^te d'Ivoire colony, while the northern part
near Lorhoso ended in former Upper Volta (present-day Burkina Faso): the Lobi people
in this latter area indeed used to pay tribute to the Bouna king.26 This most Eastern
25M'Bokolo, E., 1992. Afrique Noire, Histoire et civilisations, Du XIXe siecle a nos jours,
Paris: Hatier/AUF, 2nd edition 2004, p.65
26Boutillier, J.-L., 1993. Bouna, Royaume de la savane africaine, Paris: Karthala.
48
part of the border, near the Comoe river, is not very populated and includes national
parks: the fauna reserve of Dida in Burkina Faso and the Comoe National Park in Co^te
d'Ivoire.
The French conquest of northern Co^te d'Ivoire was achieved by the end of 1898
with the capture of Samori Toure. This conquest established a continuity between the
French Soudan and the trade posts of Grand-Bassam and Assinie on the Gulf of Guinea.
The territories that Samori had conquered in the Kong and Bouna kingdoms were put
together in the colonial district of Kong and attached to the Co^te d'Ivoire colony. For
the purpose of pacication, the territories that had resisted Samori, around Sikasso
(Kenedugu kingdom), Bobo-Dioulasso (Gwiriko people) and Gaoua (Lobi people), were
gathered in the "Second Military Territory", also named "Volta". Its military status
only ended in 1911, because these people also showed a lot of hostility to French rule.
During the World War I, the same region was again the theater of large riots against
military conscription (1914-16).
As a matter of fact, it is as if the conquests of Samori Toure had delineated the
intra-colonial boundaries between Co^te d'Ivoire on the one hand, and Soudan (Mali)
and Haute-Volta (Burkina Faso) on the other hand. An ocial decree of 1902 only
mentions a small adjustment of the most Eastern part of the border with Mali, between
the Bagoe and Leraba rivers27, and another decreee of 1903 likewise very slightly modies
the North-Eastern boundary with Burkina Faso. These modications had the objectives
of putting rebel villages under martial law; apart from this peace-making territorial
surgery, the layout of the border between the three French colonies remained undened
until 1947.
In 1904 the Second Military territory was attached to the French colony of "Haut-
Senegal-Niger" that covered almost all present-day Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, that
27Brownlie, op.cit., p.373.
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is about 2 millions of squared kilometers; the Niger colony was detached from this
set in 1911. Last, in 1919, the World War I riots had decided the French to cut the
"Haut-Senegal" in two parts in order to increase their political control: the rst part,
corresponding to present-day Mali, was renamed French Soudan (Sudan) a year later
(1920), and the second part, corresponding to present-day Burkina Faso, constituted the
Haute-Volta colony. Between 1932 and 1946, the latter was then partitioned between
former Co^te d'Ivoire, French Soudan and Niger, in order to increase forced labor supply
in the other three colonies, in particular for cocoa production in Co^te d'Ivoire.28 All the
border area that we examine was therefore annexed to Co^te d'Ivoire. In 1947, Haute-
Volta was reconstituted in its original version; the 1919 border was never altered again
afterward.
Like with Guinea, there is no detailed description of the border alignment between
Co^te d'Ivoire and either Mali or Burkina Faso, whether from colonial or post-colonial
sources.29 According to maps, half of the alignment consists of rivers, however water-
courses can be many-armed and indecisive, especially on the Malian border. For the
non-river parts, no demarcation has ever taken place; no international dispute has ever
been reported either.
S1.4. The borders between Co^te d'Ivoire neighbors
We did no specic historical work on these latter borders and mainly rely on Brownlie
(1979).
Ghana and Burkina Faso30
For its main part, the alignment of this border was xed between 1904 and 1906;
28Massa, G., and Y. G. Madiega (eds), 1995. La Haute-Volta coloniale, Temoignages,
Recherches, Regards, Paris: Karthala, pp. 13-38.
29Brownlie, op.cit., pp.371-377.
30Brownlie, op.cit., pp.280-295
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it was at that time a border between British Northern Territories of the Gold Coast
(making part of Gold Coast administration since 1897) and French "Soudan" (Sudan).
The alignment was broadly a straight line following the 11th degree of north latitude.
However, Griths (1986) mentions deviations on either side of the parallel to avoid
villages.31 The 1904 memorandum acknowledges that the chiefs of Lan and of Kounou
(Kunu) shall be compensated by respectively the British and French governments for
the loss of territories caused by the passage of the frontier-line. A tiny eastern part was
agreed after World War I (1919) when German Togoland was split between the British
and the French mandates, as again a straight line running between two pillars, at the
same time when the "Haute Volta" (Upper Volta) colony was formed.
Various sources report the boundary as demarcated during the colonial era. After
independence, between 1967 and 1972, some redemarcation works were launched on the
basis of the original report of the British and French commissioners of 1904.
Burkina Faso and Mali32
By a decree of March 1919 the French colony of "Haut-Senegal et Niger" was di-
vided and the new colony of "Haute-Volta" (Upper Volta) was constituted as a separate
entity from "Soudan" (French Sudan). The only existing pieces of evidence regarding
the border alignment come from the maps established under the French administration
(Afrique Occidentale Francaise). By the end of the 1970s, the border was very little de-
marcated on the ground, except through some segments of watercourses. In 1974 Mali
claimed that the 160 kilometers long north-eastern part was to be moved between 10
and 30 kilometers southward for ethnic purposes, i.e. Touaregs and Bellah living across
the border; the position of independent Haute Volta (soon to be renamed Burkina Faso)
31Griths, Ieuan, 1986. "The Scramble for Africa: Inherited Political Boundaries." The Geo-
graphical Journal 2(2): 204-216.
32Brownlie, op.cit., pp.426-430
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was to stick to the 1922 French colonial map.
Mali and Guinea33
This border alignment is again founded on French administrative maps, here dating
as early as 1911. However, in this case, a good proportion of the boundary follows rivers
and stream, even if the latter can be sometimes fugitive. No dispute appears to have
existed regarding this border.
33Brownlie, op.cit., pp.310-313
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Table S1.1 Initial Conditions and Early Colonial Investments: Co^te d'Ivoire Borders
during the Colonial Era
Ghana border Guinea b. Mali b. Burkina Faso b.
Border Side C. d'Iv. C.
d'Iv.
Guinea C.
d'Iv.
Mali C.
d'Iv.
Burk.-
F.
Population dens. 1910 1.6 5.0 6.4 4.8 6.3 4.5 8.5
Europeans per cap. 1910 9.3 0.5 0.4 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.7
Trade tax per cap. 1912 0.58 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.02
Teachers per cap. 1910-28 8.6 1.7 0.9 1.6 0.9 1.7 1.3
Health pers. p.c. 1910-28 8.8 1.1 1.5 2.2 3.2 2.2 2.1
Public works 1910-28 1.0 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.2
Source: French colonial administration data collected by Elise Huillery (2009), hence excluding Ghana (former
British).
Coverage: Administrative districts ("cercles") of the former French West Africa (Afrique Occidentale
Francaise) located at the border of present-day Co^te d'Ivoire. Ghana border: "cercles" of Assinie, In-
denie and Bondoukou; Guinea border: Man (C.d'Iv. side), Beyla and Nzerekore (Guinea side); Mali
border: Odienne and Kong (C. d'Iv.), Bougouni and Sikasso (Mali); Burkina Faso border: Kong and
Bondoukou (C. d'Iv.), Bobodioulasso and Gaoua (Burkina Faso). In comparison with the map of gure
H.1, the former colonial "cercles" were split hence the names do not correspond to present-day districts.
Notes: Population dens. = enumerated residents per squared kilometers; Europeans = enumerated Europeans
per 1,000 people; Trade tax = trade tax revenue per capita in 1910 French Francs; Teachers = number of
teachers per 100,000 people; Health pers. = Health personnel per 100,000 people; Public works = Public works
(infrastructures) expenditures per squared kilometers in 1910 French Francs.
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S2. The construction of variables for analysis
S2.1. Consumption
The consumption variable is the sum of four distinct components: 1. Consumption
of own food production; 2. Food expenditures including meals outside the household;
3. Housing expenditures: rents paid and imputed rents; home cleaning and reparation;
water, electricity and other fuels; 4. Other current expenditures, including education.
Consumption of own production other than food is disregarded. Gifts received in kind
are not included for they were not collected in all countries. Gifts and transfers to other
households are disregarded, as well as tax payments. Expenditures for ceremonies and
for health were not included for being too infrequent. For the same reason, durable
goods acquisition and reparation are not included (furniture, domestic appliances, radio
and TV sets, vehicles).
No correction was considered for within countries regional price levels dierences
(this kind of information is only available for the early surveys in Co^te d'Ivoire and
Ghana). Monthly data on national consumer price index (CPI) was used to express all
components in a common base-year (1988 or 1993), taking into account their specic
recall period and the month and year of recording. Although very much imperfect as
CPI are not disaggregated by products, this correction is however better than nothing
for periods of high ination: in Ghana whatever the date, in Burkina Faso and Mali
just after the CFA franc devaluation in 1994.34 Household consumption levels are then
translated in current dollars at base year exchange rates and prices (1988, 1993), using
34For Mali 1994 the correction is even cruder, as the survey only covered four months (March
to June), and the precise month of consumption recording has not been kept in the datales: we
simply do as if the survey had been implemented in April 1994, we assume that all recorded food
expenditures were made then, and that non-food expenditures, whose recall period is the year,
were uniformly distributed along the May 1993-April 1994 period. Alternatively, as mentioned
in the text, we make no correction for ination, this providing an upper bound.
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either ocial or parallel (in the cases of Ghana before 1989 and Guinea) exchange rates.
Regarding consumption of own food production, all surveys directly ask households
about the market value for each product, with a recall period that may vary from one
survey to another. In GLSS3-4 (Ghana 1992 and 1998) and EIBC (Guinea), quantities
consumed are also recorded: in that case, within PSUs median unit prices can be com-
puted and a second market value constructed. Market values are then translated into
monthly consumption (with a multiplier depending on the recall period) and divided
by the corresponding monthly CPI, then turned into annual consumption using declara-
tions about how often the product is consumed during the year (when available). They
are nally summed across products. When two measurements have been constructed
(cases of GLSS3-4 and EIBC), we check they are fairly correlated (minimum correlation
coecient of 0.5), and we take the average of the two.35
Regarding food expenditures, the procedure is nearly the same, except that quanti-
ties are not collected. All surveys record food expenditures during the last 15 days or
the last month. This allows to construct a rst simple measurement of food expendi-
tures: (i) translation into a monthly basis (double the value when the recall period is 15
days), (ii) division by monthly CPI, (iii) multiplication by 12 to obtain the annual ex-
penditures estimate. The Co^te d'Ivoire (CILSS and ENV) surveys and the early Ghana
surveys (GLSS1-2) additionally record how many months each product has been con-
sumed during the year. This allows to construct a second measurement where the last
step is replaced by (iii) multiplication by number of months of consumption to obtain
the annual expenditures estimate. In the CILSS and GLSS1-2 this number of months
is matched with a second declaration of expenditures over a recall period of one year
(rather than one month). Here again, we keep the average of the two measurements
after having checked their correlation.
35Note that the EMCES (Mali 1994) survey does not collect any information on consumption
of own production.
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Regarding housing expenditures, information usually comes from specic survey
modules, and is collected over or twelve months recall period. Combined with monthly
or yearly CPIs, we then straightforwardly obtain an annual aggregate at base-year prices.
For house-owners or households with free accommodation, the imputed rent is the pre-
dicted value derived from a regression estimated on tenants. The regression relates the
rent paid to the characteristics of the house only; one such regression is estimated for
each survey, no correction for selection is made. We check that the resulting housing
budget shares are sensible.
Last, for all other expenditures, the longest recall period (usually 12 months) has
been preferred when two recall periods are available. Exceptions are hygiene, cigarettes
and fuels. Information on education expenditures (including transportation and some-
times food) are usually derived from a specic module.
The food consumption aggregate is trimmed separately by dropping observations for
which the logarithm is under or above the mean by 5 standard deviations. Households
declaring no food consumption are directly withdrawn. This "clean" food consumption
amount is then summed with other expenditures and the total consumption amount is
trimmed again with the same 5 standard deviations rule. In the end, in all surveys,
less than 1% of households are withdrawn from the sample by this trimming procedure.
S2.2. Geographical variables
We obtain the geographical coordinates of survey clusters from combining NGA
GEOnet Names Server, Falling Rain Global Gazetteer and regional maps. These co-
ordinates are then used to construct the geographical attributes of clusters: altitude,
rainfall, distance to the nearest river and distance to national borders.
NGA GEOnet Names Server: http://earth-info.nga.mil/gns/html
Falling Rain Global Gazetteer: http://www.fallingrain.com/world
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Altitude
Elevation data are from the NASA Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM). The
data used is from the Global Coverage 3 Arc Second database, available from the USGS
EROS Data Center. The basic hgt les are rst converted to Arc Grid Ascii format
using the gdal translate utility, and then to Stata format using the ras2dta program.36
The resolution of the original elevation les is then reduced by averaging altitudes over
square blocks of 25 pixels. The coordinates of survey clusters are nally matched to
those of these squares.
USGS EROS Data Center: http://edc.usgs.gov/products/elevation.html
gdal translate utility: http://www.gdal.org/gdal translate.html
Rainfall
Rainfall data are from the NASA Global Precipitation Climatology Project (GPCP).
We use the data for the years 1984{2001. The original monthly data are averaged over
each year, and further averaged over the 1984-2001 period for the calculations in the
paper.
NASA GPCP: http://precip.gsfc.nasa.gov.
Distance to the nearest river
Hydrographic data are from the NASA Hydro 1K Africa database. For each survey
cluster, the distance to the nearest stream within the same drainage basin is computed
using the Distance Calculator utility of Mapinfo software.
NASA Hydro 1K Africa database:
http://eros.usgs.gov/products/elevation/gtopo30/hydro/africa.html
36Muller, D., 2005. "Stata in space: Econometric analysis of spatially explicit raster data",
The Stata Journal, 5: 224-238.
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Population density
Data for estimated population density in 1990 are from the Gridded Population of
the World (GPW) database.
SEDAC: http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/
Distance to cities
The Africapolis database, designed by French geographers (SEDET, CNRS and Uni-
versity Paris-7), is probably the most complete to date. It provides the geographical
location of West African cities as well as population estimates for the years 1960 to
2000.
http://www.e-geopolis.eu
Distance to border
Digital data maps for all the countries come from the USGS Africa Data Dissemina-
tion Service. Distance to the national borders is computed using the Distance Calculator
utility of Mapinfo software.
USGS: http://earlywarning.usgs.gov/adds
Border districts
Figure S2.1 thereafter provides a map giving the location of administrative districts
located in the border areas (for more details, see historical appendix). The Ghanaian
region of Brong-Ahafo extends far from the border with Co^te d'Ivoire, but in total only
one quarter of Ghanaian survey clusters are more than 100 km away from the border,
the mean distance being 77 km (GLSS1-2 and GLSS4).
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S3. Additional results at other borders
As alluded to in the main text, in previous versions of this work we also looked at
the border of Co^te d'Ivoire with Burkina Faso. However identication had drawbacks.
The western half of this border follows the Leraba and the Comoe rivers, and a few dis-
continuities in elevation and distance to river are detected. The main diculty actually
comes from the distribution of localities along the boundary. The middle part of this
border is not very populated and hardly represented in the sample, as the Co^te d'Ivoire
side lies just above a large national park; further, most Ivorian localities are urban or
peri-urban, lying around the large cities of Bouna (East) or Ferkessedougou (West). Fi-
nally and most importantly, the dierence in urban structure accounts for all the border
discontinuities in consumption per capita or children stunting that can be identied in
the rst place. It is hard to know whether this feature reects a small sample eect or
a real world pattern.
We also looked at BDs between neighbors of Co^te d'Ivoire that happen to be adjacent,
this making a set of six additional country-period pairs: Guinea/Mali in 1994, Burkina
Faso/Mali in 1994 and 1998-2001, and Burkina Faso/Ghana in 1998, and even 1992
and 2003 using DHS data. The striking result is that we could not nd any signicant
and robust BD, with one exception only: Ghanaian households seem to benet from an
increased access to electricity at the border with Burkina Faso in 2003. These results
suggest that large border discontinuities are much less likely to emerge when countries
display similar levels of wealth. Macroeconomic gures indeed show that it is only in the
second half of the 2000s that Ghana started to overtake the three other countries, and
to catch up with Co^te d'Ivoire (Eberhardt and Teal 2010). Meanwhile, Burkina Faso
and Mali were staying more or less at par, and Guinea had fallen down to their level.
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